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The Right of Innocent Passage: A Case
Study on Two Koreas
Stephen Kong*
INTRODUCTION
On June 2, 2001, three North Korean merchant ships en-
tered the body of water between the southern end of the Korean
peninsula and Cheju Island.1 The event stirred up much alarm
in South Korea,2 because no ship from either South or North
Korea had ever attempted to sail through the other's territorial
sea.3 The North Korean ships did not announce their intention
to sail through the area.4 The South Korean navy repeatedly
communicated with the North Korean ships and urged them to
leave their territorial sea.5 The North Koreans refused, arguing,
accurately, that ships of other nations had sailed through the
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., 1998,
University of Chicago. The Author dedicates this article to his parents, Dr. and Dr.
Kong.
1. See Keui-Keun Kim, One North Korean Ship is Currently Sailing Through
the South Korea's Ocean, CHOsUN DAILY (June 3, 2001), at httpJ/www.chosun.co.kr;
North Korean Merchant Ships Violate South Korean Territorial Waters (June 7,
2001), at http://www.koreasociety.org/TKSQ/NewsReview/NewsReview%20Summer
%202001.htm; Right of Innocent Passage, KOREA HERALD (Jan. 23, 2002), at
http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html-dir/2001/20010606046.asp.
2. See Kim, supra note 1.
3. See Yong-Won Yoo, "The Right of Free Passage" is the Right for Non-
Military Vessels to Sail Through Other Nation's Ocean During Normal Circum-
stances, CHOSUN DAILY (June 3, 2001), at http://www.chosun.co.kr (source only
available in Korean).
4. See In-Gu Kim & Yong-Won Yoo, Why did the North Korean Merchant
Ships Sail Through Cheju Strait Without Permission?, CHOSUN DAILY (June 3,
2001), at http://www.chosun.co.kr (source only available in Korean).
5. See id.
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area without previous notification or arrangement. 6 The South
Korean navy later came under public criticism for failing to ex-
pel the North Korean ships.7 Some even criticized the navy for
its failure to use force against the North Korean ships.8
If North Korean ships sail through the body of water in
question, instead of sailing through the high seas, they shorten
their routes by more than three hundred nautical miles. 9 Con-
sequently, they shorten their voyages by a day or two and save
money on fuel and other expenses. 10 North Korea currently
faces severe economic problems, especially a shortage of fuel,11
which makes use of this shipping route an economically efficient
courts of action.
This Note analyzes the legality of the actions taken by the
two Koreas. Part I discusses the political situation between
North Korea and South Korea, the relevant maritime laws, and
the significance of the incident on international trade. Part II
discusses three issues: first, it analyzes whether North Korea's
passage on June 2 was innocent; second, it determines whether
South Korea could lawfully deny the right of innocent passage to
North Korea in general; and third, it examines whether the
South Korean navy could have used force against the North Ko-
rean ships on June 2. South Korea hastily concluded that the
action taken by the North Korean ships was innocent and
granted the right of innocent passage to North Korea in Cheju
Strait.12 While South Korea's previous denial of the right of in-
6. See id.; Chung-Ho Yoon, Record of Communication for North Korean Ves-
sels that Invaded the Territorial Sea, CHOSUN DAILY (June 14, 2001), at
http://www.chosun.co.kr (source only available in Korean).
7. See Sung-Kyu Ahn, The Military is under Criticism for its Timid Response
to North Korean Merchant Ships, JOONGANG DAILY (June 6, 2001), at
http://www.joongang.co.kr (source only available in Korean); see also Kim, supra
note 1; Keui-Keun Kim, Interview [with the South Korean navy officer], CHOSUN
DAILY (June 3, 2001), at http://www.chosun.co.kr (source only available in Korean).
8. See Editorial, How Long Shall We Tolerate Military Incompetence?,
JOONGANG DAILY (June 16, 2001), at httpJ/www.joongang.co.kr (source only avail-
able in Korean).
9. See Kim, supra note 4.
10. See Chul-Heui Lee, The Calculated Trespass into the Territorial Sea,
JOONGANG DAILY (June 4, 2001), at http://www.joongang.co.kr (source only available
in Korean); Keui-Keun Kim, The Background Behind the North Korean Ships' Tres-
passes and Future Courses of Action, CHOSuN DAILY (June 3, 2001), at
http://www.chosun.co.kr (source only available in Korean).
11. See 2000 Report to Congress: Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula, at
http://www.defenselink.mil]news/Sep2000/koreaO9l22000.html (Jan. 26, 2001)
[Hereinafter 2000 Report to Congress].
12. See Dong-Heun Shin & Yong-Won Yoo, [Continuous Trespass by the North
Korean Ships] Incompetent Response ... Possibility of Nullifying the Maritime Bor-
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nocent passage to North Korea finds little support in interna-
tional law, the manner in which North Korea decided to exercise
its right lacked good faith and creates a strong suspicion that
the action was not an innocent passage, but an act of propa-
ganda.
I. LEGAL AND POLITICAL SITUATIONS REGARDING THE
TWO KOREAS
A. THE CURRENT SITUATION BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS
The two Koreas engaged in a bloody conflict for three years,
which ceased in 1953.13 Although the two Koreas signed an Ar-
mistice Agreement, they technically remain in a state of war.14
The hostility continues, and North Korean spies and spy ships
have been found in South Korea and in its waters. 15 During
June 1999, the North Korean navy and the South Korean navy
exchanged fire on the Yellow Sea, an area that is the subject of a
border dispute between the two countries. 16 The South Korean
navy sank a North Korean ship, and both sides suffered casual-
ties.17
Neither Korea has recognized the right of innocent passage
by the other through its territorial sea. 18 As a general rule,
when North Korean ships have entered South Korea's territorial
sea, the South Korean navy has expelled them from the area. 19
The North Korean navy has captured and detained numerous
South Korean ships that have entered North Korea's territorial
der Between the North and South, CHOSUN DAILY (June 4, 2001), at
http://www.chosun.co.kr (source only available in Korean). The South Korean gov-
ernment reached its decision only one day after the North Korean ships' passage.
Id.
13. See generally MAX HASTINGS, THE KoREAN WAR (1987).
14. See generally Special Report of the Unified Command on the Korean Armi-
stice Agreement, July 27, 1953, available at ftpJ/ftp.nautilus.org/napsnet/
agreements/armistice.txt, (September 1953) [hereinafter Armistice Agreement) (copy
of the Armistice Agreement and background information on the Agreement).
15. See Dong-Heun Shin & Yong-Won Yoo, Conditional Opening of Territorial
Sea: Inevitability of Relocating the Navy Flee to South Sea... Difficulties in Surveil-
lance, CHOSUN DAILY (June 6, 2001), at http://www.chosun.co.kr (source only avail-
able in Korean).
16. See 2000 Report to Congress, supra note 11.
17. See id.
18. See Yoo, supra note 3.
19. See id.
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sea.20
B. MARITIME LAW
1. Definition of Territorial Sea
The body of water where the North Korean merchant ships
sailed, known as "Cheju Strait"21 is part of South Korea's terri-
torial water under the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) because the area falls within twelve nau-
tical miles of the coast of South Korea. 22 South Korea signed
and ratified the UNCLOS. 23 North Korea signed but did not rat-
ify the treaty.24 Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, a State that has not ratified a treaty but only signed it
is still obliged to refrain from engaging in activities that defeat
the object and purpose of the treaty.25 The twelve-mile breadth
20. See id.
21. Aside from the rules that apply to territorial water, special rules of mari-
time law apply to "straits." "[Tihe legal situation in customary law is that straits
constitute an autonomous institution. Passage through them is neither high seas
passage, because the liberty of choice as to route and behaviour is not as great as in
the high seas, nor innocent passage, because that liberty is greater than it is in the
territorial sea." See D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 327
(1982). The legal significance of "strait" differs from the word's ordinary-use mean-
ing. See id. at 299. The authorities conflict on the legal definition of"strait." South
Korea denies that the body of water between the southern end of the Korean penin-
sula and Cheju Island constitutes a "strait" that is used for international navigation
and therefore subject to a different rule of international law. See Mark J. Valencia,
Policy Paper 33-Northeast Asia: Transnational Navigational Issues and Possible
Cooperative Responses, at http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/publications/policy-papers/
pp3303.html (last visited February 15, 2002). For purposes of this paper, however,
it is irrelevant whether Cheju Strait is "strait" or territorial water. Sailing under
the right of "innocent passage" is allowed in both territorial sea and "strait" under
international law. Had the North Korean ships sailed in the manner that is allowed
in the "strait" but not in the territorial sea, the determination whether Cheju Strait
is "strait" or not would have been relevant, but such is not the case here.
22. See Convention on Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 3, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397,
400, available at http://www.un.org/Depts.los.los94st.htm [hereinafter UNCLOS].
23. See Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the
Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the
Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of the Convention relating to
the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
fish stocks; Table recapitulating the status of the Convention and of the related
Agreements, as at 6 February 2002, at http-J/www.un.org/depts/
los/reference_fileslstatus2002.pdf (February 6, 2001) [hereinafter Status of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea].
24. See id.
25. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18(a),
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of territorial water is widely recognized and followed by the
states.26 The provisions in UNCLOS relating to navigation re-
flect customary international law as exercised by many states.27
Accordingly, even states that are not parties to UNCLOS are
bound by the provisions of the treaty relating to navigation.
Under UNCLOS, the coastal state enjoys sovereignty within
its territorial water.28 Sovereignty is a supreme and independ-
ent authority,29 and no obligation can be forced upon a sovereign
state either by the international community or by international
law. 30 There is no international norm on what actions the
coastal state may conduct in territorial water by virtue of its
sovereignty. 31 Instead, municipal law of each coastal state gov-
erns the scope of states' actions. 32
The right of innocent passage through the coastal state's
territorial water is an exception to this sovereignty.33 Essential
interests of numerous states depend on passage through territo-
rial waters, and a coastal state may not harm such interests
through unilateral action. 34 The International Court of Justice
has stated, "[t]he delimitation of sea areas always has an inter-
national aspect and cannot be dependent merely upon the will of
1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 336, 8 I.L.M. 679, 686.
26. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 189 (4th ed.
1990); FRANCIS NGANTCHA, THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE AND THE EVOLUTION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA: THE CURRENT REGIME OF 'FREE'
NAVIGATION IN COASTAL WATERS OF THIRD STATES 16 (1990); O'CONNELL, supra
note 21, at 167.
27. See Scott C. Truver, The Law of the Sea and the Military Use of the Oceans
in 2010, 45 LA. L. REV. 1221, 1223 (1985).
28. Id. at 1240; NGANTCHA, supra note 26, at 21-22, n.105-09 & 111. See
UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 2(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 400 ('The Sovereignty of a
coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters, to an adjacent
belt of sea, described as the territorial sea."). The nature, although not necessarily
its scope, of the coastal State's sovereignty over its territorial water does not differ
from the sovereignty over its land. "[Tihe rights of the coastal State over the territo-
rial sea do not differ in nature from the rights of sovereignty which the State exer-
cises over other parts of its territory.... It is also the principle underlying a num-
ber of multilateral conventions-such as the Air Navigation Convention of 1919 and
the International Civil Aviation Convention of 1944-which treat the territorial sea
in the same way as other parts of State territory." NGANTCHA, supra note 26, at 7.
29. See NGANTCHA, supra note 26, at 22.
30. See id.
31. See O'CONNELL, supra note 21, at 82-83.
32. See id.
33. BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 194. See also UNCLOS, supra note 22, art.
17-18, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 404; NGANTCHA, supra note 26, at 38.
34. See NGANTCHA, supra note 26, at 42 ("[Tlhe freedom of navigation is of such
great importance to all States").
2002]
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the coastal States as expressed in its municipal law."35 In other
words, while the coastal state enjoys sovereignty over its territo-
rial water, the extent of its sovereignty over its ocean waters is
comparatively less than its sovereignty over land.
2. The Right of Innocent Passage through Territorial Sea
Customary international law recognizes the right of inno-
cent passage through other states' territorial sea.36 To under-
stand that right further, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of
"innocent passage." International law scholars have debated
over the meaning of the word "innocent."37 While scholars have
attempted to define the term in an objective manner, subjective
interpretation by the coastal state also often defines the mean-
ing of "innocent." 38 Generally, if a ship does not harm the inter-
ests of the coastal state during or by its sail through the territo-
rial water, then the passage is deemed innocent.39 "Passage"
means to navigate through the territorial water without having
contacts with the territory of the coastal state.40 Stopping or
anchoring pursuant to ordinary navigation, or because of danger
or distress, does not discontinue the ship's passage.41
3. Limitation on the Right of Innocent Passage
Article 19, paragraph 1 of the UNCLOS provides that pas-
sage that is "prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of
the coastal State" is not innocent. 42 Article 19, Paragraph 2 of
the UNCLOS lists the following examples of non-innocent pas-
sage:
Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea
35. O'CONNELL, supra note 21, at 33 (quoting Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, 1951
I.C.J. 116, 132).
36. See BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 305; NGANTCHA, supra note 26, at 32
("[Als a general principle, the right of innocent passage requires no supporting ar-
gument or citation of authority; it is firmly established in international law.").
37. See NGANTCHA, supra note, 26, at 43-52 (summarizing the historical debate
on the meaning of the term "innocent"); O'CONNELL, supra note 21, at 271-72 (sum-
marizing four established views of the meaning of "innocent" and presenting other
possibilities.).
38. See supra note 38.
39. See supra note 38.
40. See NGANTCHA, supra note 26, at 52.
41. See id. at 54-55.
42. UNCLOS, supra note 22, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 404.
[Vo1.11:373
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it engages in any of the following activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other
manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the de-
fence or security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of
the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person con-
trary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regula-
tions of the coastal State;
(h) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or
any other facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage. 43
The meaning of the phrase "prejudicial to the peace, good
order or security" has been open to subjective interpretation by
the coastal state." In addition to the examples given in the
UNCLOS, international legal scholars hold various views on the
meaning of a non-innocent passage. If the ship carries cargo or
persons that may pose danger to the coastal state, the passage
is not innocent.45 If the ship enters the territorial sea with the
intention of committing activities other than mere passage, 46 or
if the ship commits an action that threatens the coastal state,
43. Id. at 404-05 (emphasis added).
44. See Truver, supra note 27, at 1240.
45. See O'CONNELL, supra note 21, at 272.
46. See id.
20021
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the passage is also not innocent.47 Others argue that even if the
ship takes no overt action, if its mere presence arouses the con-
cern of the coastal state, then the passage is not innocent.48
Since the coastal state enjoys sovereignty over its territorial sea,
except for the right of innocent passage, 49 the coastal state may
lawfully deny any non-innocent passage.
Moreover, despite the right of innocent passage, state prac-
tice demonstrates that even if the passage is innocent, coastal
states have denied the right of passage for reasons of national
security.50 On June 23, 1995, for example, France suspended all
navigation in the territorial waters of Mururoa.51  France
planned nuclear weapons tests later that year.52 On July 10, a
Greenpeace vessel named Rainbow Warrior II attempted to en-
ter the Mururoaen territorial water.53 The French navy boarded
the Rainbow Warrior II, arrested the crew, and seized the ves-
sel.54 Although Article 25, Paragraph 3 of UNCLOS provides
that "[tihe coastal State may, without discrimination in form or
in fact among foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified ar-
eas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if
such suspension is essential for the protection of its security,"55
France's action fell outside of the provision because the suspen-
sion was not temporary. 56 The UNCLOS does not allow for pro-
longed suspension,57 but the international community appar-
47. See id.
48. See id. at 272, nn.93 & 98.
49. See Truver, supra note 27, at 1240.
50. See Donald R. Rothwell, The Mururoa Exclusion Zone, at http:ll
law.uniserve.edu.au/law/pub/icl/lawofsea/mururoa.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. Rothwell writes, "The Mururoa Exclusion Zone demonstrates that
despite the attempts made in UNCLOS to more clearly define coastal state rights
and obligations with respect to the right of innocent passage, it remains a poten-
tially fragile right. Coastal states may still take action, either in conformity with
UNCLOS or under exceptions based on national security grounds, that will not only
hamper passage but also completely terminate the right." Id.
55. UNCLOS, supra note 22, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 407.
56. See id.
57. Some authors argue that since the security of a State is such an essential
interest, different rules of treaty interpretation should apply for the matters of na-
tional security. "The right of a State to adopt the course which it considers best
suited to the exigencies of its security and to the maintenance of its integrity, is so
essential a right that, in case of doubt, [treaty] stipulations cannot be interpreted as
limiting it, even though these stipulations do not conflict with such an interpreta-
tion." NGANTCHA, supra note 26, at 198.
[Vo1.11:373
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ently approved the French action.58
4. War and International Law
Different rules of international law, including maritime
law, apply during war. While multilateral treaties usually re-
main effective during a war between signatory states, certain
treaties are terminated in times of war. 59 Some argue that war
terminates the treaties that guarantee personal rights, such as
the right to navigate territories of another state.60 A state may
attack enemy ships in national water as well as on the high
seas.61 In other words, during war the coastal state may law-
fully attack enemy ships that are sailing through its territorial
seas, even if their passage is innocent. 62
War does not, however, excuse all restrictions on passage.
In the famed Corfu Channel Case, Albania challenged the inno-
cence of British warships' passage through its territorial water
as a defense to a claim Britain brought against Albania for
damage to its ships. 63 Four British warships sailed through the
Albanian water, and mines damaged two of them.64 The Inter-
national Court of Justice held that the passage by the British
warships was innocent, and Albania was responsible for the
damages that the United Kingdom suffered. 65
The surrounding circumstances and the restrictions that
Albania imposed on the passage of ships are important to con-
sider. Greece and Albania were in a state of war.66 Albania in-
formed the British Government that it should notify Albania
prior to attempting to send ships through the Corfu Channel.67
58. "The failure by states to protest against the French declaration.., also
demonstrates that states value the latitude under the law of the sea to completely
close their territorial sea to foreign vessels in certain limited circumstances." Roth-
well, supra note 50.
59. See MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 696, 723 (1961).
60. See, e.g., Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231 (1929) (holding that the
Jay Treaty of 1794, which guaranteed British subjects right to navigate and travel
within the U.S. territory had been terminated by the war of 1812 between the
United States and United Kingdom). But see MCNAIR, supra note 59, at 714 (noting
that the Supreme Court's decision was criticized by numerous international schol-
ars).
61. See O'CONNELL, supra note 21, at 326.
62. See id.
63. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 10.
64. See O'CONNELL, supra note 21, at 326.
65. See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 32.
66. See O'CONNELL, supra note 21, at 309.
67. Id.
20021
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Albania contended that notice was necessary as a matter of na-
tional security.68 The Court disagreed, holding, "Albania, in
view of these exceptional circumstances, would have been justi-
fied in issuing regulations in respect of the passage of warships
through the strait, but not in prohibiting such passage or in sub-
jecting it to the requirement of special authorization." 69 It ap-
pears from this decision that a state may not restrict the right of
innocent passage, at least passage by a neutral state, even dur-
ing time of war and for the purpose of national security. 70 The
Court also held that the use of force to stop the ships' innocent
passage violated international law.7 1
5. Armistice Agreements and the Right to Navigate
The Korean Armistice Agreement indicates that fighting
has ceased, but the war has not ended.72 Unlike a peace treaty,
an armistice agreement does not carry the effect of normalizing
the relationship between states.73 As with any other agreement
between the states, the respective parties are bound by the
terms of the agreement. 74 Armistice agreements typically exist
for a brief time, until the party states sign a peace treaty.7 5
Only a few incidents concerning navigation rights and armistice
agreements have arisen. An event that occurred between Egypt
and Israel during the 1950s is one such example. 76 During the
Israeli Independence War, Israel and four Arab states-Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria-entered into an armistice agree-
ment.77 Even after signing the agreement, Egypt continued to
forbid Israeli ships from sailing through the Suez Canal.78 The
UN Mixed Armistice Commission held that Egypt was illegally
68. See id.
69. See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 29-30.
70. See id.
71. Although the Court did not find that Albania laid the mines, it held that
Albania was responsible because the mines were laid within the territory of Albania
with the presumed knowledge of the Albanian government. See Corfu Channel,
1949 I.C.J. at 29.
72. See Jewish Virtual Library, Maritime Object to Suez Canal Blockade, at
http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/History/object.html (Aug. 1951).
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Jewish Virtual Library, The Suez War of 1956, at http://www.us-
israel.org/jsource/History/SuezWar.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2002).
78. See id.
[Vo1.11:373
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blocking the canal.7 9 Later, the Security Council ordered Egypt
to open the canal to Israeli ships.80 Egypt refused to comply
with the Security Council's order, and Israel later launched a
successful military attack on Egypt.8' During the Security
Council debate, representatives from numerous states insisted
that Egypt lift its restriction in the spirit of the armistice agree-
ment.8
2
C. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE PASSAGE THROUGH SOUTH
KOREA'S TERRITORIAL WATERS
1. Right of Innocent Passage and Trade
International trade depends heavily on maritime naviga-
tion.8 3 The importance of maritime trade has been noted from
the early days of international law,84 when Grotius wrote, "the
most specific axiom of the law of nations: called a primary rule
or first principle, the spirit of which is self-evident and immuta-
ble, to wit: every nation is free to travel to every other nation
and to trade with it."85 Depending on its route, it is occasionally
79. See id. Ralph Bunche, the UN negotiator who brought Israeli and other
Arab States to the negotiation table to sign the Armistice Agreement, said that
"[there should be free movement for legitimate shipping and no vestiges of the war-
time blockade should be allowed to remain, as they are inconsistent with both the
letter and the spirit of the armistice agreement." Id.
80. See id. Article 25 of the U.N. Charter provides that "[t]he Members of the
United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Coun-
cil.... ." Egypt, as a member of the U.N., should have obeyed the decision of the Se-
curity Council. Article 39 of the Charter further states: "The Security Council shall
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of ag-
gression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken
in accordance with Articles 41 (concerning measures not involving the use of armed
force) and 42 (concerning measures involving the use of armed force), to maintain or
restore international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER, art. 39.
81. See Jewish Virtual Library, supra note 77.
82. See Jewish Virtual Library, supra note 72.
83. See Dana R. Dillon, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder: How the Bush
Administration Should Handle China and South China Sea Maritime Territorial
Disputes (Sept. 5, 2001), available at http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/
bg1470.html. Over 90 percent of cross-border trade moves via ships. Id.
84. See, e.g., NGANTCHA, supra note 26, at 116, n.3 (quoting W.E. PER HALL, A
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 198 (8th ed. 1924) ("The interests of the whole
world are concerned in the possession of the utmost liberty of navigation for the
purposes of trade by the vessels of all States.")).
85. See id. at 64 n.4. Grotius also wrote, "[Liands, rivers, and any part of the
sea that has become subject to the ownership of a people ought to be open to those
who, for legitimate reasons, have need to cross over them...." Id. at n.5.
2002]
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necessary for a vessel to sail into other states' territorial seas to
reach its destination. The right of innocent passage promotes
trade by allowing ships to sail through territorial seas.8 6
2. Significance of North Korea's Ability to Sail Through Cheju
Strait
Until June 2001, North Korean ships sailed around the
south of Cheju Island to sail between the east and west coasts of
North Korea.87 North Korean vessels can shorten their trips be-
tween their two shores by 300 to 400 nautical miles if they sail
through the Cheju Strait.88 Sailing through the strait can also
shorten a trip from the west coast of North Korea to Japan 9 or
other countries east of North Korea, such as the United States.90
By being able to sail through the Cheju Strait, North Korea may
be able to engage more actively in international trade.
II. LEGALITY OF THE EVENT IN QUESTION
A. WERE THE NORTH KOREAN SHIPS SAILING THROUGH SOUTH
KOREA'S TERRITORIAL WATER?
Cheju Strait is a part of South Korea's territorial water.91
UNCLOS and customary international law recognize a twelve-
mile limit on territorial water, and Cheju Strait falls within the
twelve-mile zone extended from the southern shore of South Ko-
rea.92 Since South Korea has signed and ratified UNCLOS,93 it
may enforce a twelve-mile territorial water zone around its
86. See id. at 96 ("One of the major reasons for the existence of the right of in-
nocent passage was-and still is-to encourage, facilitate and promote such [inter-
national] trade.").
87. See Kim, supra note 1.
88. See Kim, supra note 4.
89. Japan is North Korea's largest export trading partner (amounting 27.9% of
the North Korea's total export), and the second largest import trading partner
(amounting 17% of the North Korea's total import). Gerald P. O'Driscoll, et al., 2002
Index of Economic Freedom, The Heritage Foundation (Sept. 2001), at
http://www.heritage.org/index/2002/ chapters/pdf/20021ndex.pdf. (The index speci-
fied that the data regarding the export partners are based on estimate).
90. North Korea is currently trading only with Japan, South Korea, China,
Germany, and Russia. See id.
91. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
92. See Kim, supra note 1.
93. See Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra
note 23, at 11.
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shore.94 In addition to being a signatory state to UNCLOS, 95
North Korea is bound by the rules of customary international
law, which recognizes the twelve-mile zone of territorial water.96
Accordingly, North Korea must consider and respect Cheju
Strait as part of South Korea's territorial water.
Since Cheju Strait is South Korea's territorial water, South
Korea may exercise sovereignty over the water.97 South Korean
law governs the actions that the South Korean government may
take within the Cheju Strait.98 The South Korean government
guarantees the right of innocent passage to foreign vessels sail-
ing through the Cheju Strait. 99 The South Korean navy has
military regulations mandating expulsion of North Korean ships
that enter Cheju Strait, even if they are civilian vessels.100 Arti-
cle 6 of the South Korean Maritime Law provides that when a
suspicion exists that a foreign ship conducted its passage in a
non-innocent manner, the vessel may be stopped, searched,
seized or subject to other courses of action.10
B. WAS THE PASSAGE OF NORTH KOREAN SHIPS INNOCENT?
While the territoriality of Cheju Strait is clear, the inno-
cence of the North Korean ships' passage is not. The ships ap-
peared to sail in an innocent manner, 0 2 but their intention
might have been different. Both the terms of the UNCLOS and
the reaction of the South Korean public to the sail of the ships
lead to the suspicion that the sail was not innocent.
North Korea could argue that the passage of its ships was
innocent. The ships were merchant ships, not military ves-
sels.103 One of the ships was carrying relief supplies from the
UN,'0 4 and another ship was sailing to China to transport fertil-
94. See UNCLOS, supra note 22, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 400.
95. See Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra
note 23, at 3.
96. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
99. See Kim, supra note 1.
100. See Yoo, supra note 3. The military regulation also provides that firing on
ships that are sailing through Cheju Strait is only allowed during cases of extreme
emergency. See e.g., Yong-Jong Lee, How the North Korean Merchant Ship Tae
Hong Tan Ho Was Expelled, CHOSUN DAILY (June 14, 2001), at http:/!
www.chosun.co.kr (source only available in Korean).
101. See Lee, supra note 100.
102. See discussion of the innocence of the North Korean passage infra.
103. See Kim, supra note 1; see also supra text accompanying note 1.
104. See Yoon, supra note 6.
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izers.'0 5 They did not conduct any military activity, nor did they
pollute the area or attempt to perform economic activity, such as
fishing. 10 6 The ships did not stop or anchor within South Ko-
rea's territorial sea. 0 7 Arguably, the North Korean ships were
enjoying the right of innocent passage that was guaranteed to
all other foreign ships sailing through Cheju Strait. 0 8
On the other hand, surrounding circumstances'0 9 suggest
that the sail of the North Korean ships was an act of propa-
ganda, not one of passage. If an ulterior motive existed, the
ships' passage was not innocent. 0 Article 19, Paragraph 2(d) of
UNCLOS provides that if a ship commits "[a]ny act of propa-
ganda aimed at affecting the defense or security of the coastal
State," its passage is not innocent."'
The sail of North Korean ships affected and weakened
South Korea's defense. During the sail, four South Korean navy
vessels had to follow the North Korean ships. 1" 2 North Korean
spy ships could disguise themselves as merchant ships and sail
into South Korean water." 3 Submarines may hide underneath
merchant ships that are otherwise sailing innocently, making
themselves undetectable by the South Korean navy." 4 Even if
North Korea does not explicitly commit those actions, the possi-
bility of such actions forces the South Korean navy to increase
its presence on Cheju Strait, affecting defense and security."15
The sail of the North Korean ships could have been an act of
propaganda rather than an innocent passage. The key to de-
termining the innocence of the North Korean ships' sail lies in
their intentions. 1 6 In other words, if the ships did not intend to
affect the defense or security of South Korea through their pas-
sage, then their sail still was innocent even if it unintentionally
disrupted South Korea's defense or security. 117
105. See id. Fertilizers are necessary to relieve the food shortage in North
Korea. See 2000 Report to Congress, supra note 11.
106. See supra notes 1-5.
107. See supra notes 1-5.
108. See Yoon, supra note 6.
109. South Korea and North Korea are, technically, still at war. See supra notes
14-17 and accompanying text.
110. See supra Part I.B.3.
111. See UNCLOS, supra note 22, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 404.
112. See Yoon, supra note 6.
113. See Kim, supra note 10.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See text accompanying notes 49-52.
117. See UNCLOS, supra note 22, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 404.
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It is difficult to determine whether North Korea intended to
affect South Korea's defense or security,118 or sought a shorter
passage to save time and money. 119 Most likely, it intended to
achieve both ends. Given the history of hostility,120 it is reason-
able to infer that North Korea would have known the passage of
its ships would disrupt South Korea's defense system.' 2' If
North Korea did intend to affect the defense or security of South
Korea, the South Korean navy could have rightfully interfered
with the North Korean ships' passage. 22
In addition to the examples specified in Article 19 of
UNCLOS,123 South Korea could have determined the innocence
of passage based on its subjective interpretation. 124 It could
have argued that the mere presence of ships 125 that belong to a
hostile nation disrupted the sense of peace in South Korea. The
public unrest that in fact took place in South Korea exemplifies
such disruption. 26 Although the ships were merchant vessels,
and not military vessels, the sudden appearance of enemy ships
in South Korea's territory was sufficient to cause confusion and
fear, 27 which was prejudicial to the peace and order of South
Korea. The fact that North Korea could have predicted that re-
action by the South Korean public128 casts more doubt on the
118. See supra text accompanying notes 109-115.
119. See Kim, supra note 10.
120. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text. North Korea had alterna-
tives to exercising the right of innocent passage in South Korean water. North Ko-
rea could have informed the South Korean authorities ahead of time, explaining that
the purpose of their sail was peaceful, and that there was no need for the South Ko-
rean navy to follow them. North Korea could also have sought an agreement with
South Korea, specifying numbers and types of North Korean ships permitted to sail
through the Cheju Strait. The South Korean navy could have better tracked the
movement of North Korean ships if such prior arrangements had been made be-
tween the two Koreas. In addition, the South Korean public would not have been
startled by the presence of the North Korean ships, and the peace and order of South
Korea would not have been disturbed. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying
text,
122. Since North Korea has not ratified UNCLOS, it is not bound by the specific
provisions of the Convention. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. North Ko-
rea is still bound, however, to conduct innocent passage when it sails through an-
other State's territorial water, because the rules of law concerning innocent passage
are customary international law. See supra notes 36 and accompanying text.
123. See UNCLOS, supra note 22, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 404-05.
124. See supra text accompanying note 38.
125. See UNCLOS, supra note 22, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 404-05.
126. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
128. See 2000 Report to Congress, supra note 11. Because of the history of con-
flict between the two Koreas, each side views any sudden action by the other side
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possibility that the North Korean ships intended mere passage.
South Korea could convincingly argue that the sail of the North
Korean ships was an act of propaganda and not an innocent pas-
sage.
C. ASSUMING THAT THE PASSAGE OF THE NORTH KOREAN SHIPS
WAS INNOCENT, COULD SOUTH KOREA STILL DENY PASSAGE ON
THE CLAIM OF NATIONAL SECURITY?
Even if the sail of the North Korean ships was innocent,
South Korea still could have forbidden their sail under a claim
of national security. International law is not clear on whether
and when a coastal state may deny the right of innocent passage
for the purpose of protecting national security. The French sus-
pension of passage around Mururoa Atoll and other states' si-
lent approval of the French action suggest that a coastal state
may suspend even innocent passages for national security rea-
sons. 129 The Corfu Channel case suggests otherwise. 130
On one hand, national security is such a compelling interest
of a State that it should arguably justify denial of passage
through the state's territorial water.' 3' The French government
took this position when it suspended all navigation on the terri-
torial waters of Mururoa Atoll. 32 The French government sus-
pended even innocent passage, citing national security as the
justification for the restriction. 33 The exclusion violated Article
25 Paragraph 3 of UNCLOS, because the suspension was not
temporary. 134
The Mururoaen incident does not yield any conclusive de-
termination on the appropriateness of South Korean action,
however, because the facts differ between the two incidents. In
the Mururoaen exclusion zone, France forbade ships from all
with extreme suspicion and caution. Had North Korea mentioned or announced an
intent to exercise the right of innocent passage in Cheju Strait, there would have
been less surprise among the South Korean public. Although no rule of interna-
tional law requires North Korea to announce its plan to sail, doing so would have
cast less doubt on whether the passage was innocent (i.e., for the sole purpose of
sailing) or non-innocent (i.e., with the purpose of sailing to startle the South Korean
public). Id.
129. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
131. See NGANTCHA, supra note 26, at 198.
132. See Rothwell, supra note 50.
133. See id. France planned to conduct a nuclear testing in the area. Id.
134. See UNCLOS, supra note 22, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 407.
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nations from sailing in the zone. 135 South Korea specifically ex-
cluded the North Korean ships, while the ships from other na-
tions freely exercised their right of innocent passage.1 36 Such
discriminatory exclusion directly violated Article 25 Paragraph
3 of UNCLOS. 137
The South Korean violation of the article is, arguably, a
more serious violation than the French violation of the same ar-
ticle. 38 The South Korean suspension singles out a state and
deprives it of a right that is guaranteed to all other states. Fur-
ther, the French suspension eventually ended after nuclear test-
ing was conducted, but the South Korean suspension lasted for
nearly half a century 39 and presumably would have lasted in-
definitely.
The holding in Corfu Channel opposes the proposition that
the national security interest of the coastal state justifies denial
of the right of innocent passage.1 40 Although Albania was in a
state of war, and the presence of warships in its water could
have jeopardized its national security interest,' 4 ' the Interna-
tional Court of Justice held that the British warships could have
rightfully sailed through the Albanian water as long as their
passages were innocent.142
Corfu Channel, however, also does not yield a conclusive de-
termination on the appropriateness of the South Korean action.
Corfu Channel was decided nearly a half century ago. The rule
of international law changes over time. Contemporary publi-
cists describe the right of innocent passage as a "potentially
fragile right," or an "imperfect right," 43 and the current trend is
that sovereignty of the coastal state trumps the right of innocent
passage. 14 It is unclear whether the trend is so common and
widely practiced that it allows the coastal state to suspend the
135. See Rothwell, supra note 50.
136. See Yoon, supra note 6.
137. "The coastal State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among
foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the inno-
cent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its
security, including weapons exercises...." UNCLOS, supra note 22, 1833 U.N.T.S.
at 407 (emphasis added).
138. See Rothwell, supra note 50.
139. See id.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
141. See supra note 66-68 and accompanying text.
142. See text accompanying notes 69-71.
143. NGANTCHA, supra note 26, at 197-98.
144. "[The right of innocent passage] appears today as a vestige of history under
the constant assault of an ever-expanding notion of sovereignty." Id. at 194.
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right of innocent passage on its territorial water for national se-
curity reasons. In light of the conflicting opinions, 145 South Ko-
rea could have suspended the North Korean ships' sail with
some support from the international law, even if the passage
was innocent.
D. SHOULD THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT HAVE AFFECTED
NORTH KOREA'S RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE?
Prior to the sail of the North Korean vessels on June 2,
2001, the South Korean government denied the right of innocent
passage to the North Korean ships in violation of UNCLOS,
claiming the uniqueness of the armistice agreement between the
two Koreas. 146 It is true that different rules of international law
apply during peacetime and wartime, and the state of armistice
is not a state of peace. 14v Analysis of the Suez Canal incident,
however, suggests that South Korea's claim was not valid. 48 If
armistice implies a duty to promote peace, then the situation of
armistice did not justify South Korea's denial of the right of in-
nocent passage to North Korea.
The Suez Canal incident illustrates this principle. Egypt
denied the right of passage to Israeli ships that attempted to
sail through the canal. 49 Even after the armistice agreement
was signed, Egypt continued to deny access to the canal. 50
Egypt attempted to justify its action by referring to the special
circumstances between Egypt and Israel.151 Various states criti-
cized Egypt, however, 52 and the Security Council later ordered
Egypt to open the canal to Israeli ships.'53 While it is true that
the state of war continued to exist during armistice, 54 the two
States, as the parties to the armistice agreement, should have
strived to achieve peace. 55 Egypt continued to restrict Israel's
145. See text accompanying notes 129-143.
146. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
151. See Jewish Virtual Library, supra note 72 (Comment by Sir Gladwyn Jebb,
delegate from the United Kingdom).
152. See id.
153. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
154. See Jewish Virtual Library, supra note 72 (Comment by Mr. Muniz, dele-
gate from Brazil).
155. "It is the essence of the amnesties to be a step leading to permanent peace."
Id.
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right long after the armistice agreement was signed, hampering
the peace effort. 156
The Suez Canal incident reflects the will of the Security
Council. Condemnation of Egypt's action by a wide variety of
states, such as France, the United States, and Brazil, 157 sug-
gests that a state consensus existed for the proposition that the
state of armistice does not excuse the denial of navigational
right.
The situation between North and South Korea is compara-
ble to the situation between Egypt and Israel because the two
Koreas entered into the armistice agreement to strive toward
peace.158 The purpose of the armistice agreement between the
two Koreas was to "ensure a complete cessation of hostilities...
until a final peaceful settlement is achieved."15 9 South Korea's
denial of North Korea's right to innocent passage has hampered
the effort to reach the peaceful settlement. Nearly half a cen-
tury has passed since the armistice agreement was signed, 160
and a continued restriction on passage that discriminates
against North Korea was a regression in the two Koreas' effort
for peace. 161 Accordingly, North Korea could have rightfully ig-
nored South Korea's claim that it properly denied the right of
innocent passage in Cheju Strait to the North Korean vessels
because of the state of armistice.
E. COULD SOUTH KOREA HAVE USED FORCE TO STOP THE
NORTH KOREAN SHIPS?
Although the South Korean navy did not use force to expel
the North Korean ships,162 the option was available to them.
Whether such action would have been justified under interna-
tional law is a different matter. If the passage of the North Ko-
rean ships was not innocent, then the South Korean navy could
156. "My Government believes that the imposition of these restrictions [Egypt's
denial of passage through Suez Canal for Israeli ships] and their maintenance for so
long a period after the signing of the armistice agreement is a retrogression from
what both parties committed themselves to-namely, the establishment of perma-
nent peace...." Id. (emphasis added). See Jewish Virtual Library, supra note 72
(Comment by Mr. Warren R. Austin, delegate from the United States). The armi-
stice agreement was signed on 1949, and Mr. Austin made his comment in 1951. Id.
157. See Armistice Agreement, supra note 14, at pmbl.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
161. See Jewish Virtual Library, supra note 72.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 1-8.
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use force to stop them from sailing through Cheju Strait. 163 If,
for instance, their sail was an act of propaganda aimed at dis-
rupting the defense and security of the South Korea, the country
would be justified in taking actions. 164 If the passage of the
North Korean ships was innocent, however, it is not certain
whether the use of force would have been justified.
Were the ships' passage not innocent, South Korea could
have used force to discontinue their passage both under
UNCLOS and under its municipal law. 165 Article 25 Paragraph
1 of UNCLOS provides: "The coastal State may take the neces-
sary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not
innocent." 66 While Article 279 of the Convention requires the
states to use "peaceful means" to resolve disputes regarding the
Convention, 167 a "necessary step" could entail use of force in cer-
tain situations. The North Korean ships repeatedly refused the
South Korean navy's request to sail out of the Cheju Strait and
use an alternative route. 68 Force, arguably, was the only cer-
tain way to discontinue their passage.
Since the coastal state enjoys sovereignty over its territorial
water, 69 municipal law determines what the appropriate action
is within the water. 70 The South Korean navy is authorized to
expel North Korean vessels from the Cheju Strait. 17' It is also
authorized to use force to stop the non-innocent passage of for-
eign ships.' 72 If the sail of the North Korean ships was an act of
propaganda and not an innocent passage, then the South Ko-
rean navy could have justifiably used force to stop their pas-
sage. 173
If the ships were conducting innocent passage, the interna-
tional law is less clear. Different rules apply during states of
war and of peace. 74 During a state of war, enemy ships may be
attacked regardless of the innocence of their passage. 75 The
163. See supra text accompanying notes 100-101.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 109-128.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 100-101.
166. See UNCLOS, supra note 22, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 407.
167. See UNCLOS, supra note 22, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 508.
168. See Yoon, supra note 6.
169. See supra note 28.
170. See supra text accompanying note 31.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 100-101.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 100-101.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 31, 100-101.
174. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
175. See O'CONNELL, supra note 21 at 326; see also supra text accompanying
note 21.
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South Korean navy would not have been justified in using force
against the North Korean ships under this argument, however,
because the two Koreas are in the state of armistice. 17 6 Depend-
ing on the degree of force the South Korean navy might have
used, the armistice agreement could have been breached and
the two Koreas could have fallen into a state of full-blown
war.
177
The Mururoan incident suggests that the use of some de-
gree of force may be justified, even in peacetime, under some
circumstances. 178 Citing national security reasons, the French
navy forcibly boarded the Greenpeace vessel that sailed into the
French territorial water near Mururoa Atoll in violation of the
suspension order.179 The navy used teargas to subdue the crew,
arrested them, and seized the vessel. 80 It used an extreme de-
gree of force, short of firing on or sinking the vessel. Other
states did not criticize France, however, which indicates that
they approved the French action. 81
The North Korean ships were unarmed merchant vessels. 82
They claimed that they were sailing to transport humanitarian
aid.18 3 Had the South Korean navy used force on those vessels,
as the French Navy did to the Greenpeace vessel, it would have
caused an international uproar. If the passage of the North Ko-
rean ships was not innocent but was an act of propaganda, the
South Korean navy would have had legal justifications to use
force, but it still would have faced international criticism for do-
ing so. The South Korean navy wisely refrained from using
force.
176. See Armistice Agreement, supra note 14; see also supra text accompanying
note 14.
177. See Jewish Virtual Library, supra note 72.
178. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text. One could argue that the
sail of the Greenpeace vessel was not innocent under Article 19, Paragraph 2(d) of
the UNCLOS, because the sail was an act of propaganda, and the French navy
therefore justifiably forbade its sail under the UNCLOS. See Rothwell, supra note
50. While the sail was undoubtedly an act of propaganda, it must also have been
aimed at affecting the security or defense of state to constitute a non-innocent pas-
sage. The Greenpeace vessel aimed at protesting against nuclear testing, but it is
highly implausible to claim that the purpose of its sail was to affect the defense, se-
curity or domestic peace of France. See id. Rothwell writes under the assumption
that the sail of the Greenpeace vessel was an innocent passage. See id.
179. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
180. See Rothwell, supra note 50.
181. See id.
182. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
183. See Yoon, supra note 6.
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CONCLUSION
The South Korean assertion that the state of armistice gen-
erally justifies denying the right of innocent passage to North
Korean vessels finds little support in international law. The Se-
curity Council resolution on the Suez Canal incident even sug-
gests that South Korea might have been violating international
law by denying the right to North Korea.
Regarding the sail of the North Korean vessels on June 2,
2001, however, South Korea had numerous arguments to justify
denial of passage. It is highly questionable that the sail of the
North Korean ships on June 2 was motivated by innocent in-
tent. Most likely, the sail was an act of propaganda with an ul-
terior motive to disrupt the defense system of South Korea. The
South Korean navy could have justifiably used force to stop the
ships' non-innocent passage. Even if the sail of the North Ko-
rean ships was innocent, the Mururoaen incident suggests that
a state may deny the right of innocent passage for national se-
curity purpose. South Korea had multiple arguments to deny
the passage to the North Korean vessels on June 2, and it ap-
proved the North Korean vessels' sail perhaps too hastily. Had
South Korea disapproved of the vessels' passage, however, it
would have had difficulty justifying the use of force.
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